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China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 was a massive boost
for the multilateral trading system. We present descriptive evidence on the trade effects
of China’s WTO accession. Moreover, we combine the most recent approaches from the
gravity literature of international trade to provide a causal analysis of the effects of China’s
WTO accession on bilateral trade with other WTO members. We find that the trade effect
is positive on average. Moreover, we document substantial heterogeneity in the trade ef-
fects across China’s trading partners. These findings seem to be consistent with China’s
position in global value chains.
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1 Introduction
Almost 20 years ago, in December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO),
the international institution in charge of administering and extending the rules-based inter-
national trading system. Mike Moore, at that time WTO-Director General, characterized this
event as a “defining moment in the history of the multilateral trading system”.1 China had
applied to the predecessor of the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
already in 1986. After almost 15 years of negotiations, China committed to open and liberalize
its regime in order to better integrate into the world economy and to offer a more predictable
environment for trade and foreign investment in accordance with WTO rules. Its WTO acces-
sion increased the share of world trade governed by WTO regulation from 80 percent to more
than 95 percent. In this paper, we portray how China’s WTO accession shaped its exports to
and imports from other WTO member countries.2
GATT/WTO membership can affect international trade through different channels (Fel-
bermayr et al. 2019, Larch et al. 2019). When a country enters the WTO, tariffs are typically
reduced. However, most WTO members apply their most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs to
all countries, including non-WTO members. At first sight, one would therefore not expect
too much of an effect of new WTO-membership on China’s exports. Indeed, the US granted
China MFN status already in the 1980s. However, this status was subject to annual renewal by
the US Congress, imposing a pervasive threat of revoking the MFN status. If the MFN status
had been revoked, China’s exports to the US would have been subject to much higher rates.
Hence, WTO membership resolves trade policy uncertainty. The literature argues that this
channel was particularly important in the case of China.3
On top of tariff reductions, WTO membership is associated with reductions of non-tariff
barriers. These barriers include measures imposed (i) on imports, e.g. import quotas, im-
1See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
2We also briefly explore how China’s WTO accession shaped its trade with all trading partners, regardless of
whether these are WTO member countries or not.
3Handley and Limão (2017) find that reduced trade policy uncertainty in the years after China’s WTO acces-
sion increased US consumers’ income by the equivalent of a 13-percentage-point permanent tariff decrease.
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port prohibitions, import licensing, and customs procedures and administration fees, (ii) on
exports, e.g. export taxes, export subsidies, export quotas, export prohibitions, and volun-
tary export restraints, and (iii) on the domestic economy, e.g. domestic legislation cover-
ing health, technical, product, labor, or environmental standards, internal taxes or charges,
and domestic subsidies. In fact, China committed to abolish price controls, export subsi-
dies on agricultural products, and to allow all firms to import and export all goods and trade
them throughout China’s territory with limited exceptions.4 Moreover, it implemented the
TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement to protect intellec-
tual property rights.
Although the evolution of international trade is interesting in and of itself, we are ulti-
mately interested in consequences for real per capita incomes. Frankel and Romer (1999)
have shown that openness to trade has a quantitatively large and robust positive effect on in-
come. The recent quantitative trade literature demonstrates how to map trade changes into
real income changes (Arkolakis et al. 2012). Importantly, a reduction in the domestic ex-
penditure share, which implies an increase in the share of spending on imports, is associated
with a real income gain. The intuition is that deeper trade integration allows for reaping gains
from specialization. Hence, China’s integration into the multilateral trading system has not
only real income consequences for China itself, but also for its trading partners and even for
third countries.5
The empirical literature on trade effects of GATT/WTO membership was initiated by Rose
(2004). He finds no significant trade effect of GATT/WTO membership. Tomz et al. (2007)
argue that this “interesting mystery” (Rose 2004, p. 112) can be explained by the fact that a
bunch of countries are only de jure GATT/WTO member countries, but de facto do not partic-
ipate in trade liberalization rounds. Subramanian and Wei (2007) find strong GATT/WTO ef-
fects, but only for industrialized countries. Rose (2005) finds positive WTO trade effects when
accounting for the diverse trade effects produced by regional trade agreements (RTAs). Henn
4For further details, see https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.
5Quantifying real income consequences of China’s WTO accession is beyond the scope of the paper.
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and Eicher (2011) control for observed and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity and disentan-
gle overlapping WTO and RTA membership effects. Felbermayr and Kohler (2006, 2010) argue
that joint GATT/WTO membership has a positive effect on the probability that positive trade
flows between two countries exist at all. The recent gravity literature stresses the importance
of controlling for internal trade flows. Larch et al. (2019) find that joining the GATT/WTO
increases international trade of member countries with any other country relative to domes-
tic sales on average by 72 percent and international trade with other WTO members relative
to domestic sales by 171 percent. Felbermayr et al. (2019) document substantial variation
in country-specific GATT/WTO membership effects. China’s international trade, relative to
domestic sales, has increased by approx. 60 percent after joining the WTO. On average, the
trade effect amounts to 25 percent.
Following the best estimation practices and recommendations proposed by Yotov et al.
(2016) and using their dataset, we estimate a gravity equation which includes international
and intra-national trade flows (domestic sales) and controls for multilateral resistance terms
as well as globalization effects on international trade. Larch et al. (2019) have used this ap-
proach to estimate unilateral and bilateral trade effects of GATT/WTO membership. Their
main focus is on the trade effect of the “average” new GATT/WTO member country, but they
also show that trade effects depend on the status of economic development of the trading
partners. We explore the extent to which China differs from other GATT/WTO member coun-
tries. Felbermayr et al. (2019) present country-specific trade effects of WTO membership, in-
cluding an estimate for the average trade effect of China. We adopt the approach proposed by
Baier et al. (2019) for the case of regional trade agreements to further zoom into the effect of
China’s WTO accession on trade with its different trading partners. We estimate pair-specific
and “directional” effects of China’s WTO accession. This allows us to characterize how trade
effects differ across (i) China’s trading partners and (ii) across China’s exports to and imports
from these trading partners.6
We document a substantial heterogeneity in effects on China’s international trade with
6With our GATT/WTO dummy variable approach we capture both, changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers.
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other WTO members. For example, China’s WTO accession increased its trade with Costa Rica
and Malta by, respectively, more than 1000 percent and 651 percent and lowered trade with
Hong Kong, Macao, and Sri Lanka by, respectively, 39 percent, 43 percent, and 54 percent.
China’s trade with Germany increased on average by 69 percent. At first sight, this hetero-
geneity might be surprising as non-discrimination is a prominent feature of the WTO and all
countries in the sample but one (Iran) are WTO members as well. Thus, neither can China dis-
criminate against certain WTO members nor can WTO members discriminate against China.
The heterogeneity might be explained by ex ante differences in bilateral trade barriers.7
We also uncover different effects on Chinese exports to and imports from a given trading
partner. Chinese imports from most of the countries increase stronger than Chinese exports
to these countries. This holds particularly true for most of the European countries – including
Germany – as well as for Japan and the US, as we not find a significant effect on Chinese
exports to these countries. For Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Turkey, the reverse holds true.
Chinese imports from these countries are not significantly affected, while Chinese exports
to these countries are. Chinese exports to the special administrative regions Hong Kong and
Macao as well as to Sri Lanka fall in response to China’s WTO accession. Also Chinese imports
from Macao and Sri Lanka fall. Moreover, we find a stronger than average unilateral effect of
China’s WTO accession of its trade with non-members and members.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 highlights the special role of China in
its accession to the WTO. Section 3 introduces the data and provides descriptive evidence on
the evolution of Chinese trade before and after its accession. Section 4 presents the gravity-
based causal analysis of the trade effects of China’s accession and explores the heterogeneity
of these effects. The final section contains some concluding remarks.
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Figure 1: Trade-related country characteristics of new GATT/WTO members in the year of the
accession
Notes: For the 70 countries which have accessed the GATT/WTO since 1986, the figure shows the coun-
try’s share in merchandise world trade and its openness to merchandise trade (merchandise trade in
percent of GDP) in the year of accession. It also shows the year of accession of five outstanding coun-
tries. Source: World Development Indicators. Own illustration.
2 China and its accession to the WTO
The share of world trade that is covered by WTO regulations has risen from about 80 percent
in 1996 to almost 100 percent in 2016 (Felbermayr et al. 2019, Figure 9). 70 countries have ac-
cessed the GATT/WTO since 1986. The youngest WTO member country is Afghanistan which
joined in 2016. Figure 1 plots the contributions of the 70 new GATT/WTO members to world
trade – measured as the share of merchandise trade in world trade (y-axis) – against their
trade openness – measured as merchandise trade in percent of the gross domestic product
(x-axis) – in the year of their accession. The following observations stand out. First, there is
substantial variation in the countries’ trade openness in their year of GATT/WTO accession,
but their contributions to world trade – measured as the share of merchandise trade in world
trade – has typically been negligible.8 Trade openness ranges from 29 percent (Mexico) to
7Baier et al. (2019) show that – among other things – ex ante differences in bilateral trade barriers explain
heterogeneity in the trade effects within free trade agreements. In this paper, we do not engage in explaining
differences in trade effects.
8This is why we suppress country labels for most of the countries. Table A1 in Appendix A lists all countries
that joined the GATT/WTO since 1986 and displays their trade openness and trade shares.
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175 percent (Hong Kong), with an unweighted average of 69 percent. Second, with Mexico
and Hong Kong, two large international players in terms of their world trade share joined the
GATT in 1986. Mexico has strong trade relationships with the US. Hong Kong – at the time
of its GATT accession a British dependent territory – serves as a conduit for Chinese exports.
Over the period 1988 to 1998, 53 percent of Chinese exports were shipped through Hong Kong
(Feenstra and Hanson 2004). Third, with Saudi Arabia and Russia, large oil and gas exporting
countries joined the WTO only very recently (in 2005 and 2012, respectively).
Finally, with a trade openness of 38 percent, China shows up at the lower end of the open-
ness distribution, in company of other large countries like Russia and Mexico. Its trade share,
however, amounted to as much as 4 percent in 2001. As a substantial share of trade is still
channeled through Hong Kong, this number is likely to underestimate China’s true contribu-
tion to world trade. Putting this number into perspective, the world trade shares of Germany
and the US in 2001 amount to 8.3 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Given the already
high integration into the world economy, it is interesting to explore whether China’s WTO
accession further boosted its international trade.9
China’s trade openness in the year of its accession to the WTO amounted to 38 percent,
only slightly above half of the (unweighted) average of the countries that have accessed the
GATT/WTO since 1986.10 China’s trade openness, however, has evolved very dynamically; see
Figure 2. From 1970 to 1993, it increased from 5 percent to 44 percent, which implies an av-
erage annual growth rate of more than 9 percent. It went down to 33 percent in 1999 (annual
average decline of 4.7 percent). Between 1999 and 2006, it rose to 64 percent (annual average
growth of 10.7 percent), before it went down to 34 percent in 2018 (annual average decline of
5.1 percent). Thus, China’s recent fast increase in its trade openness started already prior to
its WTO accession, which might be explained by an anticipation effect. The reversal occurred
9China also integrated “regionally” into the world economy; see Appendix C.
10Using data from Borchert et al. (2020), we have also experimented with an alternative measure of trade open-
ness where total production rather than GDP is in the denominator. The advantage of this alternative measure is
it avoids mixing gross terms (trade) and value added terms (GDP). Information about total production, however,
is not easily available; see the discussion on internal trade flows below.
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Figure 2: Evolution of China’s trade openness and share in world trade
Notes: The figure shows China’s openness to merchandise trade (merchandise trade in percent of GDP)
on the left axis and its share in merchandise world trade (right axis) for the period 1970 to 2018. Source:
World Development Indicators. Own illustration.
already prior to the financial crisis.11 The strong rise in China’s contribution to world trade
also starts in 1998, but lasts – unaffected by the financial crisis – until 2015 with an average
annual growth rate of 8.6 percent.
3 Evolution of trade across China’s trading partners
3.1 “International” transactions
We now take a closer look at Chinese exports. We first focus on “international” transactions.
We put “international” in quotation marks, as international transactions include trade with
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Although Hong Kong has been returned to China in 1997,
it is a “special administrative region” and therefore still appears as a separate entity in trade
statistics. Similarly, Macao shows up separately in international trade statistics. The political
11It is important to note, however, that the picture is blurred by China’s enormous GDP growth rates. In 2007,
for example, China’s GDP grew by 14 percent. Thus, a drop in trade openness does not imply that Chinese trade
falls.
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status of Taiwan is unclear. Some international trade statistics also contain separate numbers
for Taiwan, others do not. Given their special roles, we represent separate numbers for these
countries whenever possible.
Figure 3: Importance of Chinese export destinations
(a) 1987 (b) 2001
(c) 2016
Notes: The diagrams show the importance of the top five export destinations in a given year.
Source: Feenstra’s World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data. Own illustration.
Data on international trade flows for almost all countries or territories in the world up to
the year 2016 are provided by Robert Feenstra (World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data); see
Appendix B. Our dataset starts in 1987, the first year for which information about Chinese
trade with Taiwan is available.
The list of the top five export destinations is remarkably stable over the observed period.
In 1987, Hong Kong, Japan, the US, Germany, and Singapore are the top five export destina-
tions (in descending order of the share of Chinese manufacturing exports). In 2016, Singapore
is overturned by Korea, while the other top destinations remain the same. Interestingly, the
positions have changed. Moreover, the share of Chinese manufacturing exports the top five
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countries receive has fallen from 69 percent to 47 percent, which emphasizes the growing
importance of further destination countries. Figure 3 illustrates the importance of the top
five export destinations over time. From 1987 to 2001, the share of exports going to the US
increased by 11 percentage points, while at the same time the share of exports going to Hong
Kong fell by 10 percentage points. From 2001 to 2016, the share of exports going to Hong
Kong fell by further 9 percentage points, but the share of exports going to the US also fell by
7 percentage points. The share of Chinese exports that Germany received remained quite the
same. Singapore lost some importance, Korea gained some importance. While the rest cat-
egory receives 31 percent of Chinese exports in 1987 and 2001, this share increases to more
than 50 percent in 2016.12
In the given period, all the top export destinations are GATT/WTO members.13 Figure 4
shows the evolution of Chinese exports to these countries. Chinese exports to a given disti-
nation country are normalized to their 2001 value, the year of China’s WTO accession. Thus,
we cannot compare the values of exports across destinations, but explore the evolution of
Chinese exports to a given destination over time.
Chinese exports to all these countries have increased already prior to the year 2001. Note
that exports to Hong Kong are smaller in 2001 than in 2000. Over the period 2001 to 2016,
however, exports to all destinations dramatically increase, with a drop in 2009 due to the fi-
nancial crisis and at the end of the observed period. Based on export dynamics, we can iden-
tify three different groups of destinations. First, exports to Hong Kong and Japan increased by
factors 3 to 4 until 2014. There is a negative trend after 2014 that turns out to be particularly
strong for Hong Kong. While for a long time, Hong Kong was only member of a regional trade
agreement with mainland China (date of entry into force: 2003), it has become more active in
terms of regional trade policy since 2011. Japan has integrated regionally since 2002.
Second, Chinese exports to Germany and the US increased by factor 4.4 to 6, with a sharp
12We double-checked export shares in the years 2001 and 2016 using data from Borchert et al. (2020).
13Entering new regional trade agreements may entail trade diversion away from China. These effects are ig-
nored in our descriptive analysis, but accounted for in the regression analysis, see below. Appendix C contains
information on regional trade agreements that entered into force in the relevant period.
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Figure 4: Evolution of Chinese exports to its top destination countries (2001 = 100)
Notes: The graphs show the evolution of Chinese manufacturing exports to a given destination. Ex-
ports to a given destination in 2001 are normalized to 100.
Source: Feenstra’s World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data. Own illustration.
rise in exports to Germany until 2011 and a sidewards trend since then. During the period,
Germany encountered a lot of “regional” trade integration, both through the enlargement
of the EU and through trade deals of the EU with countries around the globe. The strong
increase in exports to Germany might reflect the link between the two hubs of the “Factory
Asia” and “Factory Europe” in global value chains (World Bank Group et al. 2017, Figure 6).
Finally, Chinese exports to the other Asian countries Korea and Singapore increased by factor
7 until 2015 and dropped thereafter.
We now differentiate export destinations by GATT/WTO membership in the year of the
observation. The group of non-GATT/WTO members is shrinking, while the group of GATT/WTO
members is becoming larger over time; see Table A1 in Appendix A. For the sake of a clear pic-
ture, Hong Kong is shown as an extra group, while Macao and Taiwan are excluded from the
analysis. Figure 5 shows the shares of Chinese exports to the different groups of countries for
the three exemplary years 1987, 2001, and 2016. The share of exports that go to GATT/WTO
members grows from 59 percent in 1987 to 75 percent in 2001 and 82 percent in 2016. At
the same time, however, the share of exports to Hong Kong – which contain to a large extent
exports to other countries – declines. The sum of the export shares that go to GATT/WTO
10
Figure 5: Chinese exports as a share of total exports
Notes: Chinese export destinations are grouped by GATT/WTO membership in the year of observa-
tion. Hong Kong is shown separately. Macao and Taiwan are excluded from the analysis. They receive
0.02 percent, 1.17 percent, and 1.6 percent of Chinese exports in, respectively, 1987, 2001, and 2016.
Source: Feenstra’s World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data. Own illustration.
members and Hong Kong marginally increase from 90.5 percent to 93.8 percent over the en-
tire period. The share of exports to the shrinking group of non-WTO members rises from 2.6
percent in 2001 to 5 percent in 2010. Its drop in 2012 might be explained by Russia’s WTO
accession in that year.14
3.2 Intra- and international trade flows
Following the practice in the recent international trade literature, we now take intra-national
trade flows into account. Arguably, the largest share of sales is accomplished on the domestic
market. Including them allows for identifying trade diversion from domestic sales.
Although one might think that the value of domestic transactions can easily be observed,
they have to be computed from production and trade data. Combining different data sources
with different product classifications is a complicated issue. We therefore rely on data pro-
14Alternatively, we classify destination countries by the status of their WTO membership in 2001 such that the
groups of countries do not vary over time. The share of exports to WTO members as of 2001 increases from 1991
to 2003. The drop in the share of exports to Hong Kong, however, shows up more pronounced, so we see a slight
reduction in the sum of the shares of exports that go to GATT/WTO members and Hong Kong from 91.5 percent
to 88 percent over the entire period. While the share of exports to non-GATT/WTO members steadily declines
from 7.5 percent to 2.7 percent from 1987 to 2001, it increases again thereafter.
11
vided by Yotov et al. (2016). The dataset contains 65 countries and covers the years 1986 to
2006 in 4-year intervals.15 Focusing on a shorter time span has two advantages. First, the fi-
nancial crisis in the years 2008 and 2009 does not blur the picture. Second, international frag-
mentation of production has substantially increased in the last decade, and China is heavily
involved in global value chains. In our analysis, we look at trade flows in gross terms, which
are only a good proxy for international transactions if there is not much trade in intermediate
inputs. With a lot of trade in intermediate inputs, value added trade would be a better proxy.
Value added and gross trade flows can differ substantially (Johnson and Noguera 2012). The
problem is less severe in the considered time period, but this leaves out ten years of China’s
post WTO accession time.16
Figure 6 displays manufacturing exports to GATT/WTO members and Hong Kong relative
to Chinese internal trade.17 Relative exports to GATT/WTO member countries increase from
4.6 percent in 1986 to 24.5 percent in 1998. In 2002, the share amounts to 27.3 percent and
remains stable thereafter. Exports to Hong Kong relative to Chinese domestic trade amounts
to 3.4 percent in 1986 and about 9 percent in 1998. They fall slightly to 6.8 percent in 2002
and 5.2 percent in 2006, respectively.
Summing up, our descriptive analysis does not show a clear picture. China’s WTO acces-
sion seems to have increased its exports to other WTO members. If we take exports channeled
through Hong Kong into account, however, the evidence is less clear. Moreover, Chinese ex-
ports to non-WTO members have also risen after China’s WTO accession. In order to obtain
a clear(er) picture, we turn to a causal analysis.
15The latter implies that we do not observe 2001, the year of China’s WTO accession. The countries included
in the dataset are those listed in Table A2 plus China and Iran.
16The disadvantage is, of course, that we only cover two periods after China’s WTO accession.
17In the dataset, the number of non-GATT/WTO countries is small. Exports to these countries, relative to
Chinese international trade flows, are negligibly small.
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Figure 6: Chinese exports relative to internal trade
Notes: Chinese export destinations are grouped by GATT/WTO membership in the year of observa-
tion. Hong Kong is shown separately. Macao and Taiwan are excluded from the analysis. Exports
to non-GATT/WTO countries, relative to Chinese internal trade, are negligibly small and not shown.
Source: Data from Advanced Guide on Trade Policy Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016). Own illustration.
4 A causal analysis of the heterogeneous trade effects of China’s WTO
accession
The gravity model of international trade has become the workhorse for the estimation of
causal trade effects of various trade policies. In this paper, we utilize this framework to es-
timate the causal effect of China’s WTO accession. In its simplest form, the gravity equation
explains bilateral trade flows by the sizes of the two countries – typically measured by their
GDPs – and by proxies for bilateral trade costs. We expect joint GATT/WTO membership to
reduce trade costs and therefore to enhance international trade.
Given the prevalence of regional trade agreements such as the European Union (EU) or
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada, and Mexico, it
is important to control for them in trade policy analysis. Physical trade barriers such as ge-
ographical distance are time-invariant.18 To a large extent, this also holds true for informal
barriers such as differences in languages or in cultural roots. In order to control for time-
18The trade barrier effect of distance may vary over time. The approach is well suited to control for time-
varying distance effects; see Bergstrand et al. (2015) and Yotov (2012).
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invariant determinants of trade costs, we include country-pair fixed effects in the regression
analysis. The presence of pair-fixed effects also alleviates the problem of endogenous selec-
tion into regional trade agreements (Baier and Bergstrand 2007).
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that a theory-consistent specification of the
gravity equation requires to control for the average barriers to trade of the two trading par-
ties with all their partners. As these so-called “multilateral resistance terms” are essentially
unobservable, country fixed effects are used. As we work in a panel data context, we in-
clude exporter-and-time and importer-and-time effects that incorporate outward and inward
multilateral resistance terms and other time-varying country-specific characteristics such as
country size.
In line with the latest insights of the gravity literature, we include intra-national trade
flows into the analysis. Specifications with intra-national trade flows allow for capturing trade
diversion from domestic sales. Given that domestic sales are typically very large, taking ac-
count of trade diversion from domestic sales has turned out to be important (Yotov 2012, Dai
et al. 2014). They also allow for controlling for global trends in international trade by means
of time-varying border effects (Bergstrand et al. 2015).
We estimate by Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). PPML handles heteroscedas-
ticity in the errors terms (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006). It is therefore the preferred esti-
mation technique in recent trade applications.19
4.1 Effects of common GATT/WTO membership
Adopting the approach from Larch et al. (2018, 2019), we specify the estimation equation as
follows:
19PPML also allows to deal with zeros in international trade, but zeros are not a problem in our dataset. Wei-
dner and Zyklin (2020) argue that (i) estimates from so-called three-way fixed effects PPML models are biased
due to an “unique type” of an incidental parameter problem and (ii) standard errors are biased when the number
of periods is small. We have experimented with their approach to numerically quantify the biases of the point
estimates and the standard errors. The overall conclusions remain unaffected. Results are available upon request
from the author.
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Xij,t = exp [α0 + α1WTOij,t + α2 (WTOij,t · CHNi,j) + α3RTAij,t]
× exp
[






The variableXij,t accommodates exports from country i to country j if i 6= j as well as internal
trade flows if i = j. WTOij,t is a dummy variable that takes one if the exporter and the im-
porter are both GATT/WTO member countries and the transaction is international.20 CHNi,j
is a dummy variable that takes one if one of the trading partners is China. The estimated co-
efficient α̂2 captures by how much the effect for China differs from the average effect. We
have no expectations about the sign of α2. If α̂1 > 0 and α̂2 > 0, China’s WTO accession had
a stronger than average pro-trade effect. The RTAij,t is a dummy variable that takes one if
both countries are members of the same regional trade agreement. We include time-varying
border dummies BRDRij,t which take one for international transactions in a given year. πi,t
and χj,t represent the set of exporter-and-time and importer-and-time effects. µ̄ij represents
the set of symmetric country-pair fixed effects. The variable εij,t is the error term.
Table 1 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) are based on a dataset which includes
only international trade flows, but covers the period from 1987 to 2016. In columns (3) and
(4), we turn to the shorter dataset. Again, we include only international trade flows. In
columns (5) and (6), we also include intranational trade. In columns (1), (3), and (5), we set
α2 = 0 and estimate only the average effect, while in the remaining columns we also identify
the differential effect for China.
Columns (1) and (2) imply that common WTO membership reduces trade. The trade ef-
fect of China’s WTO accession is not statistically different from the average; see column (2).
In the shorter and smaller sample, the GATT/WTO effects are insignificant; see columns (3)
and (4). In all these specifications, in contrast to our intuition, regional trade agreements do
20Due to the presence of pair fixed effects (see below), α1 is identified from country pairs where at least one
trading partner accesses the WTO during the observed period. Table A1 in Appendix A shows that in our sample,
eleven countries plus China access the GATT/WTO between 1987 and 2016.
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Table 1: Trade effects of joint GATT/WTO membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Only international trade flows With intra-national trade
Large dataset Small dataset Small dataset
WTO -0.205 -0.207 -0.038 0.043 0.477 0.214
(0.087)** (0.089)** (0.182) (0.255) (0.077)*** (0.081)***
WTOCHN 0.012 -0.203 0.282
(0.055) (0.252) (0.115)**
RTA -0.031 -0.031 -0.052 -0.052 0.199 0.200
(0.044) (0.044) (0.057) (0.057) (0.069)*** (0.070)***
Notes: Results from estimating equation (1) on different samples. Large dataset : Feenstra’s
World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data. Small dataset : Advanced Guide on Trade Policy
Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016). Estimation method: PPML. All regressions include a compre-
hensive set of exporter-and-time, importer-and-time, and (symmetric) pair-specific fixed
effects (all not shown). Regressions with internal trade additionally include time-varying
globalization effects (also not shown). Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the
level of symmetric country pairs. *** and ** indicate significance at the 1 percent and 5
percent level, respectively.
not turn out to have significant (positive) trade effects.
As argued above, in the absence of internal trade flows, we cannot identify trade diver-
sion from domestic transactions. In the sample with internal trade flows, we indeed find
that common GATT/WTO membership increases international trade by exp(0.47) − 1 = 60
percent; see column (5). On average, the effect is only exp(0.21) − 1 = 23 percent. For coun-
try pairs that involve China, the effect is significantly larger, namely exp(0.21 + 0.28)− 1 = 63
percent; see column (6). The estimated RTA coefficient implies that in the preferred specifica-
tions, regional trade agreements increase bilateral trade among members by exp(0.2)−1 = 22
percent.21
On top of the trade effects, we can compute the tariff equivalents of the trade cost shock
induced by common GATT/WTO membership as exp(−α̂/β̂tariff ) − 1. In order to do so, we
21Using a larger sample and the same estimation technique, Felbermayr et al. (2019) and Larch et al. (2019)
find smaller RTA effects. Without controlling for domestic sales (and time-varying globalization effects) and not
taking heteroscedasticity into account, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find larger RTA effects, while Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006) report RTA effects of similar magnitude.
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need an estimate of the elasticity of international trade flows in tariffs. A typical estimate is
−β̂tariff = 5 (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Under this assumption, the average joint
GATT/WTO membership effect is equivalent to the abolishment of a exp(0.47/5) − 1 = 9.2
percent ad valorem tariff. While the average tariff equivalent is exp(0.21/5)− 1 = 4.3 percent,
for pairs that involve China it amounts to exp((0.21 + 0.28)/5)− 1 = 10.2 percent.
4.2 Pair-specific and direction-specific estimates
We now explore the heterogeneity of China’s WTO accession effect across WTO member coun-
tries as of 2001. We present pair-specific and direction-specific estimates.



















In this equation, the dummy variableWTONoCHNij,t is one if both trading partners are GATT/WTO
members, but neither of the countries is China. ω is a country which is GATT/WTO member
at some point in our sample, except China.22 As above, the dummy variable WTOij,t takes
one if both countries member at time t andCHNi,j is dummy variable that takes one if either
the exporter or the importer is China. ωi,j is a set dummy variables that take one if either the
exporter or the importer is country ω. The estimated coefficients α̂(2,p) represent pair-specific
average effects of joint WTO membership when one of the trading partners is China. For the
pair-specific average effects the direction of trade is not important. Consider China and Ger-
many. The pair Germany-China appears twice in every year: we have exports from China to
Germany and exports from Germany to China. In the years 2001 and later, the interaction
term for the pair Germany-China takes on one.
22All countries in our sample but Iran are GATT/WTO members.
17
Figure 7 displays the estimated coefficients α̂(2,p) and the 95 percent confidence inter-
vals.23 For the sake of illustration, we present the results in four panels. Panel (a) shows esti-
mated undirected effects above 1, panel (b) those between 0.6 and 1, panel (c) those between
0 and 0.6, and panel (d) those below 0. While most of the average effects are significantly
different from zero at the 10 percent level, this is not true for Bulgaria (see panel (a)), Jor-
dan and Qatar (panel (b)), Tunesia, Uruguay, Indonesia, Mauritius, and Sweden (panel (c)),
as well for Nepal (panel (d)). The largest effects show up for Costa Rica and Malta. Using
the point estimate, China’s WTO accession has increased trade with Costa Rica on average by
factor exp(2.445) = 11.5 (1.050 percent) and with Malta on average by factor 7.5 (650 percent).
Arguably, Chinese trade with countries like Costa Rica and Malta is small. Negative average
trade effects arise for Sri Lanka (-59 percent), Macao (-43 percent), and Hong Kong (-39 per-
cent). These results are not surprising. The ties between China and Sri Lanka have been rel-
atively strong even before China’s accession. Given this strong initial position, Chinese trade
with Sri Lanka falls relative to domestic transactions and transactions with non-WTO mem-
bers. The incentive to channel trade through Macao and Hong Kong, both special adminis-
trative regions of China, has been reduced since mainland China accessed the WTO in 2001,
which may explain the corresponding negative estimates. The coefficient for Nepal is nega-
tive as well, but not statistically different from zero. Chinese trade with Japan, the US, and
Germany – countries among the group of top 5 Chinese export destinations – has increased
on average by, respectively, 86 percent, 84 percent, and 88 percent; see panel (b). Korea and
Singapore – further important export destinations – show up in panel (c) with average trade
effects of, respectively, 68 percent and 41 percent.
23For a correspondence of country ISO codes to country names, see table A2 in Appendix A. Standard errors
are “three-way” clustered by exporter, importer, and year. Clustering standard errors by symmetric country pairs
yields very similar confidence intervals. All countries in our sample but Iran are GATT/WTO members in some
year covered by the dataset.
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Figure 7: Pair-specific trade effects of joint WTO membership with China
(a) Coefficients larger 1 (b) Coefficients between 0.6 and 1
(c) Coefficients between 0 and 0.6 (d) Negative coefficients
Note: The figure shows the pair-specific (undirectional) trade effects α̂2,p of joint WTO membership
with China, which are obtained from the estimation of equation (2) using data from Advanced Guide
on Trade Policy Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016). Standard errors are “three-way” clustered by exporter,
importer, and year.


















In this specification, ωi is a set of dummy variables for exporting and ωj a set of dummy
variables for importing GATT/WTO member countries. CHNi and CHNj take one if, respec-
tively, the exporting country or the importing country is a China. α2,x is the exporter-specific
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effect of joint WTO membership with China, while α2,m is the importer-specific effect of joint
WTO membership with China. Hence, we take the direction of trade into account. Con-
sider again China and Germany. In this case, the pair China-Germany and the pair Germany-
China are treated as two different pairs. The pair fixed effects are allowed to be asymmetric,
µij 6= µij , which means that they vary by direction as well.
Table A2 in Appendix A displays the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the
undirected country pairs; see columns (1) and (2). The remaining columns show the esti-
mated coefficients and standard errors for directed country pairs. Columns (3) and (4) show
the effects on Chinese exports, while columns (5) and (6) show the effects on Chinese imports.
In all specifications, standard errors are “three way” clustered at the exporter, importer, and
year.
Figure 8 illustrates the heterogeneity of the WTO effect on Chinese exports to and imports
from a particular trading partner that is GATT/WTO member. The effect on a country’s im-
ports from Chine (Chinese exports to this country) appears on the x-axis, while the effect on a
country’s exports to China (Chinese imports from this country) shows up on the y-axis. Trade
effects are set to zero for directional estimates that turn out to be insignificant at the 10 per-
cent level. For the sake of illustration, effects on Chinese imports that are larger than 700%
are not shown.24
The following observations stand out. First, Chinese exports to Hong Kong significantly
decline, while Chinese imports from Hong Kong are not significantly affected. This suggests
that China’s WTO accession reduces the incentive for channeling Chinese exports through
Hong Kong. Second, China’s exports to Macao, a special administrative region, and Sri Lanka,
fall, relative to domestic transactions and transaction with non-WTO members. Third, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (South America) as well as Island, Finland, and Turkey (Europe)
significantly import more from China, while Chinese imports from these countries do not
change significantly (see the positive part of the x-axis). Hence, China seems to have im-
proved market access to these countries, while vice versa, the same is not true. Forth, China
24Trade effects are larger than 700% for Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Malta, and the Philippines.
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Figure 8: Heterogeneity in direction-specific trade effects of joint WTO membership with
China
Note: The figure plots the effects of China’s WTO accession on GATT/WTO member countries’ exports
to China (y-axis) against the effects on these countries’ imports from China (x-axis) (directional trade
effects). These effects are computed from the coefficients α̂2,x and α̂2,m, which are obtained from the
estimation of equation (3) according to exp (α̂2,.)− 1 using data from Advanced Guide on Trade Policy
Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016).
imports significantly more from a number of European countries (including Germany), Japan,
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Asia), as well as the US, while Chinese export to
these countries do not significantly change (see the positive part of the y-axis). These coun-
tries seem to have improved access to Chinese markets for final and/or intermediate goods.
Interestingly, the US shows up in this list of countries. While this finding does not seem to
be in line with the literature on the “China shock” (see the survey in the NBER Reporter 2016
Number 1), it might be explained by the fact that China received the MFN status in the US
even prior the official WTO accession. Finally, both Chinese exports to and imports from
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a number of countries significantly increases. While for the UK and Nigeria, the change in
imports from China is larger than the change in exports to China, for the bulk of countries
the change in exports to China dominates the change in imports from China. These coun-
tries include India (South Asia), Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, and Malta (Europe), Canada
and Mexico (North America), Costa Rica (Central America), Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador
(South America), South Africa (Southern Africa), Morocco and Egypt (North Africa), as well as
Israel and Qatar (Near Eastern Countries). For Qatar, the effects on exports and imports are
quite balanced in percentage terms (see 45-degree line).
The pattern that arises in Figure 8 seems to be consistent with common perceptions about
China’s position in global value chains (World Bank Group et al. 2017, Figure 6). China is the
hub of the “Factory Asia”, mainly sourcing from the other Asian countries in the first quadrant
of the figure and from Australia. Japan is also integrated in the “Factory Asia” and appears as
both a supplier of intermediate goods and a consumer of final goods. China also appears as
large destination market for products from the “Factory Europe” and the “Factory America”
whose hubs are, respectively, Germany and the US.
4.3 Unilateral GATT/WTO accession effects
GATT/WTO membership may enhance the environment for all international transactions,
including those with non-member countries. GATT/WTO members are forced to make their
trade rules as transparent as possible, which also facilitates trade with non-member coun-
tries. In the standard gravity framework without internal trade flows, the presence of time-
varying country fixed effects precludes the validation of this hypothesis.
In the presence of internal trade flows, we can explore unilateral effects of GATT/WTO
accession. The estimation equation is the following:
Xij,t = exp [α0 + α1oneWTOij,t + α2 (oneWTOij,t × CHNi)]
× [α3WTOij,t + α4 (WTOij,t × CHNi,j)]
× exp
[







In this specification, the variable oneWTOij,t is a dummy variable that takes one if the ex-
porting country i is a GATT/WTO member at time t, while the importing country j is not, and
the transaction is international. Only in the presence of intra-national trade can α1 be iden-
tified. The estimated coefficient α̂1 captures by much how bilateral trade is larger if exactly
one trading partner is a GATT/WTO member. CHNi is a dummy variable that takes one if the
exporting country is China. Thus, α̂2 captures by how much the unilateral GATT/WTO effect
differs if the WTO member is China. As above, WTOij,t is a dummy variable that takes one
if both members are GATT/WTO member countries and the transaction is international. By
construction, the estimated coefficient α̂3 captures the effect that emerges in addition to α̂1
if the partner country is also a GATT/WTO member.25 CHNi,j is dummy variable that is one
if the international transaction involves China.












Notes: Results from estimating equation (4) using data from the Advanced Guide on Trade Policy
Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016). Estimation method: PPML. All regressions include a comprehensive set
of exporter-and-time, importer-and-time, (symmetric) pair-specific, and time-varying globalization
fixed effects (all not shown). Standard errors in parenthesis and clustered at the level of symmetric
country pairs. *** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent and 10 percent level, respectively.
Table 2 presents the results. In column (1), we set α2 = α4 = 0. On average, GATT/WTO
25Note that the interpretation of of α3 in specification 4 differs from the interpretation of α1 in specification
1. In specification 1, the control group is spanned by country pairs where both countries or one country is not
not GATT/WTO member plus domestic transactions, wheras in specification 4, the control group only comprises
domestic transactions.
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membership increases trade with non-members by exp(0.99) − 1 = 169 percent. In a larger
dataset covering more countries and years, Larch et al. (2019) find a smaller unilateral GATT/WTO
effect, suggesting that also unilateral GATT/WTO trade effects are heterogeneous across coun-
tries. The additional effect on bilateral trade with other GATT/WTO members is substan-
tial. In total, bilateral trade of GATT/WTO members with other countries (non-members and
members) increases by exp(0.99 + 0.95) − 1 = 600 percent, relative to domestic trade. This
effect is identified from the eleven countries plus China that have accessed the GATT/WTO
since 1987; see Table A1 in Appendix A. Column (2) shows that our large effects are mainly
driven by China. The average unilateral trade effect of GATT/WTO membership is not sta-
tistically different from zero. For China, the effect is positive. Moreover, the additional effect
that arises if the partner country is also GATT/WTO member is larger if China is involved.
5 Concluding remarks
Instead of providing a summary, we make some concluding remarks. First, although we ar-
gued that it might be advantageous not to have the recent decade in the dataset that contains
internal trade flows, it is a clear limitation of our analysis that the period considered after
China’s WTO accession is (i) very short and (ii) one with a high growth in Chinese openness to
trade. Moreover, the number of countries included in the sample is small. Larch et al. (2019)
and Felbermayr et al. (2019) work with an extended dataset that covers more countries and
years. It might be worthwhile to replicate the regression analysis of section 4 with an updated
dataset.26 Second, we may underestimate the true effect of China’s WTO accession because
in our regression analysis, we ignore both anticipation effects, which we see in our descrip-
tive analysis and which have been rationalized in the literature, and phasing-in effects. Third,
although we include directed pair fixed effects in the estimation of directed trade effects in
order to control for directed pair-specific unobserved heterogeneity, we only include a sin-
gle RTA dummy. We could control for observable pair-specific heterogeneity by including a
26The dataset provided by Borchert et al. (2020) is very detailed, but mainly covers the years after China’s WTO
accession.
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battery of RTA-specific dummies (Henn and Eicher 2011). Fourth, we work with aggregate
bilateral data, ignoring the sectoral dimension as well as input-output linkages. It would be
interesting to allow for a richer structure in the analysis. Fifth, from our regression analysis
we only obtain so-called partial equilibrium trade effects. By partial equilibrium we mean
that all other determinants of bilateral trade flows such as country sizes and multilateral re-
sistance terms are held constant. Clearly, changes in bilateral trade costs have an impact on
the entire trade cost matrix and therefore all countries’ multilateral resistance terms, as well
as all their GDPs. Thus, China’s WTO accession also affects trade among non-WTO members.
Yotov et al. (2016) demonstrate how partial equilibrium trade effects can be translated into
general equilibrium effects. Finally, we do not explain why the trade effects of China’s WTO
accession differ across China’s trading partners and across China’s exports to and imports
from a given trading partner. We leave all these extensions for further research. Despite the
limitations, the paper shows what has been put at risk recently. The year 2018 has witnessed
US tariff increases and retaliatory tariffs. This rise in tariffs not only has direct trade and
real income consequences, but also undermines the multilateral trading system. Moreover,
the recent policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have not only important implications
for domestic production and sales, but also for international trade in intermediate and final
goods.
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1986 Hong Kong 175% 1.7% 1996 Bulgaria 82% 0.1%
1986 Mexico 29% 0.9% 1996 Ecuador 35% 0.1%
1987 Antigua & Barb. 79% 0.0% 1997 Mongolia 88% 0.0%
1987 Botswana 128% 0.1% 1997 Panama 35% 0.0%
1987 Morocco 32% 0.1% 1998 Kyrgyzstan 82% 0.0%
1988 Lesotho 138% 0.0% 1999 Estonia 124% 0.1%
1990 Bolivia 33% 0.0% 1999 Latvia 62% 0.0%
1990 Costa Rica 60% 0.0% 2000 Albania 39% 0.0%
1990 Tunisia 74% 0.1% 2000 Croatia 57% 0.1%
1990 Venezuela 51% 0.4% 2000 Georgia 34% 0.0%
1991 Macao 94% 0.0% 2000 Jordan 76% 0.0%
1991 El Salvador 40% 0.0% 2000 Oman 84% 0.1%
1991 Guatemala 32% 0.0% 2001 China 38% 4.0%
1992 Mozambique 38% 0.0% 2001 Lithuania 89% 0.1%
1992 Namibia 77% 0.0% 2001 Moldova 99% 0.0%
1993 Bahrain 146% 0.1% 2002 Taiwan NA NA
1993 Brunei Darus. 97% 0.1% 2003 Armenia 70% 0.0%
1993 Dominica 57% 0.0% 2003 Macedonia 74% 0.0%
1993 Fiji 72% 0.0% 2004 Cambodia 112% 0.0%
1993 Mali 39% 0.0% 2004 Nepal 37% 0.0%
1993 Saint Lucia 69% 0.0% 2005 Saudi Arabia 73% 1.1%
1993 St. Vinc. & the Gr. 67% 0.0% 2007 Tonga 50% 0.0%
1993 Swaziland 114% 0.0% 2007 Viet Nam 144% 0.4%
1994 Angola 101% 0.1% 2008 Cabo Verde 48% 0.0%
1994 Djibouti 42% 0.0% 2008 Ukraine 85% 0.5%
1994 Grenada 44% 0.0% 2012 Russia 39% 2.3%
1994 Guinea 36% 0.0% 2012 Samoa 55% 0.0%
1994 Guinea-Bissau 84% 0.0% 2012 Vanuatu 45% 0.0%
1994 Honduras 65% 0.0% 2013 Laos 45% 0.0%
1994 Pap. New Guinea 75% 0.0% 2013 Tajikistan 63% 0.0%
1994 Paraguay 54% 0.0% 2014 Yemen 46% 0.1%
1994 Qatar 70% 0.1% 2015 Kazakhstan 42% 0.2%
1994 Saint Kitts & Nev. 51% 0.0% 2015 Seychelles 102% 0.0%
1994 Slovenia 94% 0.2% 2016 Afghanistan 37% 0.0%
1994 Solomon Isds 60% 0.0%
1994 UAR 83% 0.6%
Notes: GATT/WTO membership: CEPII’s Gravity Dataset. Openness (merchandise trade in percent
of GDP) and trade share (merchandise trade in percent of world trade): World Bank Open Data. Own
calculations. Countries in bold are included in the dataset and change their membership status during
the observed period. Countries in italics are also included in the dataset, but are GATT/WTO over the
entire observed period.
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Table A2: Pair- and direction-specific trade effects of joint WTO membership with China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Av. Chinese trade with. . . Chinese exports to. . . Chinese imports from. . .
ISO Country Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
ARG Argentina 0.88+ 0.35 0.79+ 0.47 0.78 0.56
AUS Australia 0.56+ 0.13 0.22 0.32 0.87+ 0.36
AUT Austria 0.53+ 0.09 0.21 0.36 0.87+ 0.36
BEL Belgium 0.82+ 0.24 0.56 0.39 0.97+ 0.43
BGR Bulgaria 1.06 0.65 1.54+ 0.64 -0.51 0.67
BOL Bolivia 1.54+ 0.18 1.05+ 0.43 4.54+ 0.75
BRA Brazil 0.88+ 0.45 1.12+ 0.41 0.52 0.43
CAN Canada 0.81+ 0.16 0.52+ 0.31 0.97+ 0.39
CHE Switzerland 0.35+ 0.12 -0.13 0.29 0.89+ 0.37
CHL Chile 0.82+ 0.14 0.28 0.27 1.34+ 0.40
COL Colombia 1.88+ 0.31 1.37+ 0.32 3.85+ 0.58
CRI Costa Rica 2.45+ 0.88 0.90+ 0.42 5.02+ 0.72
CYP Cyprus 0.46+ 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.39
DEU Germany 0.63+ 0.12 0.26 0.32 1.02+ 0.40
DNK Denmark 0.53+ 0.11 0.19 0.39 0.79+ 0.36
ECU Ecuador 1.59+ 0.24 1.23+ 0.34 1.42+ 0.60
EGY Egypt 1.04+ 0.16 0.70+ 0.31 1.87+ 0.48
ESP Spain 0.52+ 0.20 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.38
FIN Finland 0.68+ 0.39 0.90+ 0.36 0.64 0.48
FRA France 0.44+ 0.16 0.16 0.31 0.70+ 0.41
GBR United Kingdom 0.95+ 0.24 0.79+ 0.29 0.67+ 0.35
GRC Greece 0.44+ 0.18 0.14 0.30 -0.18 0.36
HKG Hong Kong -0.49+ 0.20 -0.80+ 0.44 -0.64 0.40
HUN Hungary 1.21+ 0.14 0.87+ 0.41 1.36+ 0.57
IDN Indonesia 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.37 0.38 0.32
IND India 1.21+ 0.21 0.92+ 0.41 1.35+ 0.52
IRL Ireland 1.36+ 0.21 0.92+ 0.34 2.06+ 0.44
ISL Iceland 1.08+ 0.10 0.72+ 0.31 0.01 0.41
ISR Israel 1.31+ 0.33 1.07+ 0.39 1.44+ 0.49
ITA Italy 0.34+ 0.19 0.17 0.34 0.46 0.35
JOR Jordan 0.74 0.54 0.74+ 0.40 -1.46+ 0.55
JPN Japan 0.62+ 0.14 0.06 0.30 1.15+ 0.41
KEN Kenya 0.59+ 0.18 0.22 0.37 0.71 0.68
KOR Koreaa 0.52+ 0.22 0.07 0.30 1.00+ 0.45
KWT Kuwait 0.88+ 0.33 0.71 0.54 0.63 0.41
LKA Sri Lanka -0.88+ 0.28 -1.16+ 0.56 -1.02+ 0.51
MAC Macao -0.56+ 0.11 -1.04+ 0.50 -0.77+ 0.44
MAR Morocco 1.08+ 0.25 0.85+ 0.31 1.01+ 0.50
MEX Mexico 1.63+ 0.20 1.34+ 0.37 1.59+ 0.35
MLT Malta 2.02+ 0.53 1.08+ 0.31 4.63+ 0.65
MUS Mauritius 0.14 0.13 -0.26 0.35 2.05+ 0.46
MYS Malaysia 0.59+ 0.12 0.28 0.35 0.89+ 0.36
NGA Nigeria 1.14+ 0.24 0.82+ 0.36 0.64+ 0.31
NLD Netherlands 0.94+ 0.19 0.64+ 0.33 0.81+ 0.42
NOR Norway 0.60+ 0.16 0.32 0.32 0.74+ 0.36
NPL Nepal -0.26 0.16 -0.39 0.52 -1.17+ 0.47
PAN Panama 0.94+ 0.25 0.51 0.38 1.94+ 0.69
PHL Philippines 1.24+ 0.53 -0.05 0.38 2.62+ 0.41
POL Poland 0.81+ 0.17 0.53 0.43 0.63 0.58
PRT Portugal 0.75+ 0.20 0.26 0.31 1.63+ 0.38
QAT Qatar 0.72 0.46 1.05+ 0.40 1.07+ 0.42
ROM Romania 0.81+ 0.40 0.80 0.71 0.30 0.70
SEN Senegal 0.51+ 0.20 0.03 0.51 1.93+ 0.55
SGP Singapore 0.34+ 0.08 -0.09 0.38 0.73+ 0.36
SWE Sweden 0.06 0.22 -0.08 0.49 0.34 0.45
THA Thailand 0.71+ 0.21 0.13 0.36 1.30+ 0.47
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 0.61+ 0.15 0.38 0.32 -0.74+ 0.43
TUN Tunisia 0.38 0.54 0.64+ 0.33 -0.73+ 0.34
TUR Turkey 0.96+ 0.40 0.97+ 0.36 -0.48 0.46
TZA Tanzania 0.53+ 0.24 0.22 0.44 -0.03 0.61
URY Uruguay 0.22 0.55 0.54+ 0.31 -0.19 0.37
USA USA 0.61+ 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.86+ 0.40
ZAF South Africa 1.06+ 0.35 0.76+ 0.37 1.25+ 0.63
Notes: Results from estimating equation (2) with symmetric pair fixed effects (columns (1) and (2)) and (3) with asymmetric pair fixed effects
(columns (3) to (6)) using data from the Advanced Guide on Trade Policy Analysis (Yotov et al. 2016). Estimation method: PPML. All regressions
include a dummy for common membership in a RTA, a bilateral GATT/WTO membership dummy for pairs that do not involve China, a com-
prehensive set of exporter-and-time, importer-and-time, pair-specific, and time-varying globalization fixed effects (all not shown). Standard
errors are “three-way” clustered by exporter, importer, and year. + indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
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B Data sources
B.1 World Bank Data
World Bank Data can be downloaded from https://databank.worldbank.org/home.aspx. We
make use of the following series: (i) Merchandise trade (% of GDP): TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS, (ii)
Merchandise imports (current USD): TM.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT, (iii) Merchandise exports (cur-
rent USD): TX.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT.
B.2 World Trade Flows (WTF) Bilateral Data
The WTF Bilateral Data can be downloaded from Robert Feenstra’s website: https://cid.
econ.ucdavis.edu/Html/WTF_bilateral.html. They contain aggregate international bilat-
eral trade in manufacturing, mining (including oil), and agricultural goods on an annual basis
for (more than) 200 countries and territories from 1987 to 2016. Values of bilateral trade in
these files are in USD 1,000 (nominal, not adjusted for inflation).
B.3 An Advanced Guide to Trade Policy Analysis: The Structural Gravity Model
The corresponding datasets can be downloaded from the UNCTAD/WTO website: https:
//vi.unctad.org/tpa/web/zips/vol2/ch1.zip. They contain information on bilateral intra-
and international trade in goods for 69 countries from 1986 to 2006 in 4-year intervals. The
data is described in Yotov et al. (2016).
B.4 CEPII’s Gravity Dataset
CEPII’s Gravity Dataset can be downloaded from Thierry Mayer’s Gravity Cookbook website
at https://sites.google.com/site/hiegravity/data-sources. We use the information on
GATT/WTO membership and joint membership in regional trade agreements.
C Regional trade integration of China and its trading partners
This appendix lists China’s regional trade agreements (RTAs)that entered into force after its
WTO accession in 2001. Moreover, it shows the RTAs of its top trading partners. RTAs may
entail trade diversion effects which are accounted for in the descriptive analysis in section 3.
In the estimation analysis in section 4, we control for RTAs among all countries in the sample.
For a complete list of RTAs, see the WTO RTA Database (http://rtais.wto.org) and the most
recent version of Mario Larch’s Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch
(2008).
China. Since its WTO accession, China joined the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (entry into
force: 2002) as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 2005), signed RTAs
with the special administrative regions Hong Kong (2003) and Macao (2003), and signed RTAs
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with a number of other countries (Chile, 2006; Pakistan, 2007; New Zealand, 2008; Singapore,
2009; Peru, 2010; Costa Rica, 2011; Iceland, 2014; Switzerland, 2014; Australia, 2015; Korea,
2015; and Georgia, 2018).
Germany (EU). On top the enlargement of its single market and agreements with EU ac-
cession countries, the EU signed RTAs with Turkey (date of entry into force: 1996), Tunesia
(1998), South Africa (2000), Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Mexico (2000), Jordan (2002), Chile
(2003), Lebanon (2003), Egypt (2004), Algeria (2005), the CARIFORUM States (2008), Pupua
New Guinea/Fiji (2009), Korea (2011), Eastern and Southern African States (2012), Columbia
and Peru (2013), Central America (2013), Ukraine (2014), Cameroon (2014), Georgia (2014),
Cote d’Ivoire (2016), and Ghana (2016).
Hong Kong. Hong Kong signed RTAs with New Zealand (entry into force: 2011), Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland (members of the European Free Trade Association,
EFTA, 2012), and Chile (2014).
Japan. Japan signed regional trade agreements with Singapore (2002), Mexico (2005), Malaysia
(2006), Chile (2007), Thailand (2007), Indonesia (2008), Brunei Darussalam (2008), the South-
east Asian Countries (ASEAN, 2008), Philippines (2008), Switzerland (2009), Viet Nam (2009),
India (2011), Peru (2012), Australia (2015), and Mongolia (2016).
Korea. Since 2002, Korea has signed regional trade agreements with China via the Asia Pa-
cific Trade Agreement (entry into force: 2002), Chile (2004), Singapore (2006), EFTA (2006),
ASEAN (2010), India (2010), EU (2011), Peru (2011), US (2012), Turkey (2013), Australia (2014),
Canada (2015), China (2015). New Zealand (2015), Viet Nam (2015), and Colombia (2016).
Singapore. Singapore entered regional trade agreements with Southeast Asian countries
(ASEAN, 1993), New Zealand (2001), Japan (2002), ETFA (2003), Australia (2003), US (2004),
China via ASEAN (2005), India (2005), Jordan (2005), Korea (2006), New Zealand, Brunei Darus-
salam, and Chile (2006), Panama (2006), Japan via ASEAN (2008), China (2009), Peru (2009),
Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and via ASEAN (all 2010), Costa Rica (2013), Gulf Cooperation
Council (2013), and Chinese Taipei (2014).
US. The US signed regional trade agreements with Canada (entry into force: 1988) which
was superseded by the agreement with Canada and Mexico (1994), Jordan (2001), Singapore
(2004), Chile (2004), Australia (2005), Morocco, Central America (2006), Bahrain (2006), Oman
(2009), Peru (2009), Korea, Colombia, and Panama (all 2012).
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